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Abstract 
 
Numerical fiscal rules mitigate the bias of pro-cyclicality, as an alternative to discretionary 
measures conducted by policy makers. We assess whether fiscal rules impact budget balances 
and sovereign yields, and we perform a simulation exercise to compute debt developments of 
EU countries, assuming that they had implemented a numerical expenditure rule in 1990. Our 
panel analysis covers 27 EU countries between 1990 and 2011. We find that fiscal rules 
contribute to the reduction of budget deficits, specifically expenditure rules, which 
significantly impact primary expenditure and conclude that countries with rules experienced 
lower sovereign bond yields. The simulations show that when the same rule is applied to 
different countries, it produces very different results, particularly on account of the initial 
level of primary expenditure.   
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1.  Introduction 
Over the years, concern over high budget deficits and pro-cyclical fiscal policies has 
grown. In the European Union (EU) several efforts have been undertaken to control this bias. 
The Maastricht Treaty was implemented in 1992, which defined specific criteria for entering 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): that debt-to-GDP ratio should not be over 60% 
and that the budget deficit has to be limited to 3% of GDP. In addition, the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced to guarantee the fulfilment of the referred criteria, 
establishing sanctions for those countries that exceeded these limits. Later on, some reforms 
were made to the SGP, however EU countries constantly ran budget balances and debt ratios 
that were above the accepted thresholds. 
Some additional measures were taken to strengthen the framework of the SGP and to 
ensure fiscal sustainability. The Fiscal Compact and the Six Pack were signed in 2012, which 
reinforced and introduced new rules at both national and supranational level. These rules are: 
a maximum limit of annual structural deficits of 0.5 per cent of GDP, and the implementation 
of automatic mechanisms that are triggered when deviations from the rule occur. The 
supranational rules focus on debt and non-discretionary expenditure. Debt ratio has to be 
reduced at an annually rate of no less that 1/20
th
 of the difference between the observed level 
and the target level, and annual growth of expenditure should not exceed a medium-term rate 
of growth. 
Numerical fiscal rules are cited in the literature as a solution for this bias of pro-
cyclicality and as an alternative to discretionary measures being introduced by policy makers 
(Kopits & Symansky, 1998). Such rules contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation and 
sustainability of public finances, by targeting fiscal aggregates such as budget balance and 
government debt, or even subsets of these aggregates, such as public expenditure or revenue. . 
Our analysis is based on two datasets of numerical fiscal rules, elaborated by the 
European Commission and by the IMF, for the EU 27 Member States from 1990 to 2011. We 
assess the link between improvements of budget balance and developments of yield spreads 
and the use of fiscal rules. Moreover, we focus only on rules that target public expenditure 
and we perform a simulation of the expenditure path and debt level that is associated with the 
application of a specific rule. 
The paper is organised as follows: The next section provides an overview of the 
existing related literature; Section 3 specifies the data and the variables, and provides some 
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stylised facts; Section 4 presents the methodology and the main results and. finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature 
The existing literature has proven the impact of better fiscal policies on output gap and 
on cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) (Gali & Perotti, 2003; Turrini, 2008). More 
specifically, some authors have tried to explain the contribution of numerical fiscal rules to 
the improvement of fiscal stance (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). Additionally, more 
attention has been given to the expenditure side of the balance sheet, as Ayuso (2012) 
explains, because it is the one variable that can be controlled more directly by governments. 
Generally, the results indicate that fiscal rules do improve public finances and that numerical 
expenditure rules can enhance budgetary discipline (Hauptmeier et al., 2010; Holm-Hadulla et 
al., 2010; Wierts, 2008). 
The most common definition of such rules is the one suggested by Kopits and 
Symansky (1998), whereby fiscal rules are a permanent numerical constraint on fiscal policy 
applied to an indicator of fiscal performance, or to subsets of these overall aggregates. The 
authors also make assumptions about the criteria for applying rules and in what conditions 
this occurs. The motivations for implementation that are more often cited are: macroeconomic 
stability; support for other macro policies; sustainability of public finances and adverse 
market reactions and spillover effects. Some aspects that are considered when introducing a 
fiscal rule include: the statutory basis; enforcement; monitoring of compliance and long-term 
commitment. Several institutional arrangements can easily work, such as: constitutional, legal 
or treaty provision and regulation or policy guidelines. For enforcement and monitoring, the 
authors recommend that this should be carried out by an independent authority. Finally, 
Kopits and Symansky (1998) stress that fiscal rules can bring about great gains in credibility 
if the government commits itself to the rules with total transparency. 
In Kumar et al. (2009), fiscal rules are defined as an institutional mechanism designed 
to support fiscal credibility and discipline, to contain the size of the government and to 
guarantee intergenerational equity. For Budina et al. (2012), fiscal rules are used when there 
are distorted incentives and pressures to overspend, contributing to debt sustainability and 
fiscal responsibility. Schuknecht (2004) mentions a different way in which rules have an 
impact: rules anchor expectations about the sustainability of fiscal policy in the future, 
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especially for the time inconsistency problems
1
, as they limit the behaviour of governments. 
Further clarification is needed concerning types of fiscal rules, as the type of fiscal rule 
depends on the fiscal aggregate targeted. Budina et al. (2012) have a simple definition, which 
is described below: 
- Debt rules that target the public debt as a percentage of GDP are the most effective in 
terms of convergence to the defined objective. However, there are a few setbacks, as 
debt levels are not easily influenced by budgetary measures in the short-term and they 
offer no practical guidance to policy makers. Moreover, when the target is binding, 
fiscal policy can become pro-cyclical when the economy is hit by a shock.  
- Budget balance rules affect the variable that influences debt ratios, which is under the 
control of policy makers, allowing for operational guidance which debt rules do not 
provide. These rules can account for cyclicality, allowing for economic stabilisation 
and addressing the consequences of economic shocks. 
- Expenditure rules can limit total, primary or current spending. They do not have direct 
impact on debt sustainability, as they do not limit the revenue side. They are, however, 
appropriately used as a tool for consolidation and sustainability, when matched with 
debt or budget balance rules. Expenditure rules are not consistent with discretionary 
fiscal stimulus and the amount of resources spent by the government is directly 
established by these rules. 
- Revenue rules set the upper and lower limit on revenue and are intended to prevent 
excessive tax burdens and improve revenue collection. Similar to expenditure rules, 
revenue rules also have no effect on the control of public debt. The revenue side is 
very cyclical, so it might be difficult to impose limits on their development. Similar to 
expenditure rules, they have greater impact when the objective is to change the size of 
government. 
 
Implementation of fiscal rules cannot be done without compromising other aspects. 
Ayuso et al. (2007) refer to the tension between fiscal discipline and the achievements of 
fiscal policy over the cycle, due to the pressure of resorting to contractionary fiscal policy in 
periods of slow growth. The authors defend that the existence of clear escape-clauses 
                                                     
1
 The author refers to the solution of time inconsistency problems when exposing the problem of correcting fiscal 
situations with discretion. Policy makers after making a commitment have economic or political incentives to 
brake it. Fiscal rules appear as an alternative where there is no time inconsistency problems.  
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contributes to the minimisation of tension. They also identify second trade-off effects between 
low deficits and the desirable level of specific types of government spending. The creation of 
protection categories of expenditure not covered by rules is presented as a solution. Finally, 
the attainment of low deficits can be due to “creative accounting” practices and one-off 
procedures, which can be diminished by designing proper rules and by creating adequate 
institutions for fiscal monitoring and control. 
Empirically, we can find a plethora of results that justify and support the use of fiscal 
rules. Firstly, Turrini (2008) states that fiscal policy has been increasingly recognised as being 
effective on output (when properly designed) and that it could be the only tool left to offset 
demand shocks with a supranational monetary policy. Gali & Perotti (2003) found that, after 
the Maastricht Treaty, fiscal policy became a-cyclical, which Turrini (2008) also concludes, 
essentially at the margin. This is a concept that needs further explanation: fiscal policy 
becoming a-cyclical at the margin means that the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) 
is not influenced by changes in the cycle. Therefore, this cannot be used to conclude whether 
fiscal policy contributes, or not, to improvements in the output gap. However, the results 
evaluated across the cycle can be different: by analysing fiscal policy on average, it is 
possible to come to conclusions about the impact of reducing, or expanding, existing 
imbalances. Turrini (2008) reports that CAPB tends to fall when output is above potential 
levels, and rises when it is below. 
Furthermore, the effective impact of fiscal rules on budget balance has also been tested 
in the existing literature, and results show a robust link between numerical fiscal rules and 
fiscal performance. Therefore, stronger rules lead to a higher CAPB, and this effect becomes 
weaker when the dependent variable is debt. This link is also robust with respect to the 
criteria used to construct the fiscal rules indexes (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008).  
(Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009) also observe that fiscal rules have an impact on primary 
balance, and conclude that if the debt ratio is below 80%, a strong fiscal rule contributes to 
the improvement of primary surplus.  
The European Commission (2008) reached similar conclusions and found that the 
CAPB improved after the introduction of fiscal rules, remaining stable, on average, over the 
period in analysis; whereas cyclically adjusted primary expenditure declined significantly 
over the period, after an expenditure rule was implemented, when compared with the average 
change over the period. Finally, in an exercise to assess the determinants of Excessive Deficit 
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Procedure fiscal forecasts, Pina and Venes (2011) report that a higher coverage of strong 
expenditure rules is associated with more prudent forecasts. 
Some authors tried to go further by assessing the different impacts of fiscal revenue 
and expenditure. The results show that revenue is essentially a-cyclical and that expenditure is 
significantly pro-cyclical, which explains the behaviour of fiscal policy (Gali & Perotti, 2003; 
Wierts, 2008). 
In a paper dedicated to the survey of expenditure rules’ characteristics and forms of 
their implementation, Ayuso (2012) explains why these types of rules are more beneficial to 
use. His argument is that they provide a better balance between macroeconomic stabilisation 
and budgetary discipline. The reasoning is straightforward: expenditure is the part of the 
budget that governments can most easily control and it is also more likely to induce deficit 
bias. The formulation and monitoring of the rule is simpler, leading to more transparency and 
does not prevent automatic stabilisers from operating. 
To that extent is it justifiable to focus on expenditure policies and on the solution for 
their pro-cyclicality? Wierts (2008) states that expenditure rules can be a solution and his 
results suggest that the stronger expenditure rules are, the weaker the effects of revenue 
shocks are. Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) reach similar results and additionally find that the 
effectiveness of expenditure rules depends on the type of government expenditure, by taking 
into account: that more flexible spending leads to more pro-cyclical biases, while fixed 
expenditure – interest expenditure – is less subject to changes by policymakers and has no 
cyclical pattern. Table I summarises some of the studies available for dealing with fiscal rules.  
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Table I - Related Literature 
Author Data Study Conclusions 
Afonso & 
Hauptmeier
, (2009) 
1990 -
2005 
EU-27 
Impact of fiscal rules and 
government decentralisation 
on a country’s fiscal 
position.  
The primary balance surplus increases as a result of 
increases in the stock of government debt. Fiscal 
rules and a lower degree of public spending 
decentralisation contribute to a better primary 
surplus. 
When debt-to-GDP ratio is below 80 per cent a 
strong fiscal rule contributes to improving the 
primary budget balance. 
1 1it i it it it it t its b z f x u              
Debrun et 
al. ( 2008) 
1990 – 
2005 
EU - 25 
Assesses the link between 
fiscal rules and fiscal 
discipline and the 
determinants of their 
implementation. 
 
Fiscal rules lead to higher cyclically-adjusted 
primary balances and the types and design of rules 
affects their effectiveness. 
Fiscal rules are more efficient than expenditure 
rules, if the target is budget balance and general 
government debt. 
, 0 , 1 , , ,'i t i t i t i t i i tp d Rules x            
Holm-
Hadulla et 
al. (2010) 
2002-2008 
EU 
Analyses the impact of 
expenditure rules on the 
propensity of governments 
to deviate from expenditure 
targets when surprised by 
cyclical conditions. 
 
Government spending reacts pro-cyclically to 
changes in the output gap. 
Strong expenditure rules contribute to reducing this 
tendency. 
Flexible Spending items have greater influence on 
the behaviour of government spending. 
, , , , ,( )
k k
i t i t i t i t i i t i tdev c d OG OG ER X u          
Turrini, 
(2008) 
1980-2005 
EU - 11 
The estimation of fiscal 
reaction functions in good 
and bad times and for 
expenditures and revenues. 
Fiscal policy is pro-cyclical in good times, due to 
the behaviour of public expenditure. Expenditure 
rules, when strong, can be the solution for bias. 
Hauptmeier 
et al. (2010) 
1999-2009 
DE, IT, 
FR, PT, 
ES, EL, 
IR. 
A comparison study 
between actual expenditure 
trends and debt paths and 
rule-based expenditure 
developments. 
For the period 1999-2009, neutral expenditure rules 
resulted in lower primary expenditure ratios. (2-3 
1/2 p.p. in 2009). 
Public debt rations would have been around 60% in 
2009. 
Wierts 
(2008) 
1998-2005 
EU-15 
Assesses the role of national 
expenditure rules in limiting 
expenditure bias and pro-
cyclicality. 
Higher values of the institutional strength of 
expenditure rules lead to a more neutral response to 
revenue shocks. Results are not conclusive about 
the causality of expenditure rules in expenditure 
outcomes. The existence of a third variable can be 
the explanation: political preferences. 
 
3.  Data and Variables 
3.1. Data 
Our database covers 27 EU countries between 1990 and 2011: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and The United 
Kingdom. 
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All fiscal and macroeconomic variables were extracted from the AMECO dataset 
These are: CAPB, Debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), Primary expenditure (pe), Output gap 
measured as the gap between actual and potential gross domestic product (outputgap), 
10-year sovereign bond yield (yield), short-term interest rate (I), current account 
balance (CA), consumer price index (CPI), real effective exchange rate (REER), 
industrial production (IP) and finally, GDP growth rate (GDPgr). The measurement of 
international risk aversion is taken from the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX), from Yahoo! Finance. 
In order to access the impact of particular events on the dependent variable in 
consideration, we include a set of dummy variables in the regressions, with the 
following definitions: 
 EMU: is a dummy for the run-up to the EMU, that takes the value 1 for the EU-
15 countries and years between 1994 and 1998 (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et 
al., 2008). 
 SGP: represents the introduction of the SGP and takes the value 1 for Euro-area 
countries and years after 1998 (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). 
 Enlargement: is set to 1 for the 10 countries entering EU in 2003 and after 
(Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). 
 Election year: takes the value 1 if Parliamentary elections took place (Klaus 
Armingeon, 2012). 
 Change in Government Ideology: takes the value 1 if a change took place in the 
ideological composition of the Cabinet (Armingeon et al., 2012). 
The EC’s fiscal rule index (FRI) is constructed based on information collected 
directly from Members States. The dataset covers all types of numerical fiscal rules: 
budget balance, debt, expenditure and revenue rules; and all level of government: 
central, regional and local, general government and social security. The survey reports 
information that is divided into five criteria: the statutory base of the rule, the room for 
revising objectives, mechanisms for monitoring compliance and enforcement of the 
rule, the existence of predefined enforcement mechanisms, and the media visibility of 
the rule. This index covers the period of 1990-2011. 
The IMF’s fiscal rule index has a much wider coverage, comprising information on 
numerical fiscal rules for 81 countries, with a time frame that stretches from 1985 to the 
end of 2012. The type of rules concerned and their characteristics are broadly similar to 
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the ones of the EC’s index.  For the purpose of comparability, we only consider this 
index for the countries and for the years available in the EC’s index. 
The statistical information regarding the number of observations, average and 
standard deviation of all variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in 
Appendix B.  
 
3.2. Stylised Facts 
Based on the EC’s FRI, the number of numerical fiscal rules in place since 1990 
has grown continuously from 13 rules to a total of 77 in 2011 (Figure A-I in Appendix 
A). Rules targeting budget balance represent the majority of rules in place from 1990 to 
2011, with debt rules and expenditure rules increasing considerably in recent years. 
Rules targeting government revenue are those that have less representation (Figure 
A-II).  
Concerning the type of government covered, most of the rules were applied to 
Local Government throughout the years, with a growing representation in recent years 
of rules applied to General Government (Figure A-III in Appendix A). Central 
Government applied the most expenditure rules, whereas General Government and 
Local Government were the ones that targeted budget balance more (Table II). 
 
Table II Total numerical fiscal rules by type of government and aggregate targeted 
(1990-2011) 
  GG LG RG CG SS Multiple Total 
BBR 15 18 6 5 5 6 55 
DR 7 11 2 3 1 3 27 
ER 5 0 1 14 3 8 31 
RR 2 0 0 3 1 3 9 
ER/BBR 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Total 29 29 9 25 10 22 124 
Note: BBR – Balance Budget Rule; DR – Debt Rule; ER – Expenditure Rule; RR 
– Revenue Rule; GG – General Government; LG – Local Government ; RG – 
Regional Government; SS – Social Security. 
Source: Numerical Fiscal Rule Database, European Commission. 
 
Currently, almost all EU countries have fiscal rules in place. Italy is the country 
that has most rules - ten during the range of years considered (see Figure A-IV in 
Appendix A), whereas those with less rules are Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania 
(Error! Reference source not found.). Cyprus, Greece and Malta never adopted one 
numerical fiscal rule. In 2011, the country with the most rules applied was France - six, 
(Figure A-V in Appendix A) and almost 30% of countries had only 2 rules in place.  
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Turning now to the analysis of the evolution of FRI per country, we can see 
countries that have no variation in the way they implemented numerical fiscal rules, 
starting with the countries already mentioned above that have no rules in force (Cyprus, 
Greece and Malta), to countries like The Netherlands, Latvia, Romania which have only 
changed their rules a few times, through to more dynamic countries that make more 
frequent changes to the rules, such as Germany (Appendix A, Figure A-VI to A-IX). 
 
4.  Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1. Empirical specifications 
For the empirical analysis, we use a fiscal reaction function to assess the impact of 
the existence of fiscal rules on the primary balance (Debrun et al., 2008). Therefore we 
have estimated a fiscal reaction function following the common approach in the 
literature (see Table I for a review of the literature on the subject):  
 
                                                          (1) 
 
where capbit is the cyclically adjusted primary balance in country i, at time t, βi 
represents the individual effects of each country i, debtit-1 is the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
country i in period t-1, outputgapit-1 is the lagged output gap, friit is the fiscal rule index 
and finally, xit represents a set of variables that can have additional explanatory power, 
focusing on specific events (e.g. election years and the run-up to EMU). 
After computing the results we expect ϕ > 0, which means that more and better 
rules (better FRI) impact positively on the value of CAPB, leading to a healthier fiscal 
position. 
As mentioned above, we undertake this exercise using FRI from the EC and 
compare these results with the ones using the IMF’s FRI. In addition, in order to assess 
the effectiveness of expenditure rules, we compute an expenditure rule index based on 
the EC Fiscal Rule Dataset and use primary expenditure as a dependent variable. 
In order to have an additional assessment of the importance of numerical fiscal 
rules for long-term government bond yields, we also estimate a specification for the 
analysis of the impact of FRI on 10-year maturity bond yields: 
 
                ̅                          , (2) 
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where,         is the 10-year maturity bond yield,  ̅   is a vector comprising CAPB, 
debt, CA, REER, IP, GRPgr and CIP, for period t, and country i. vixit is the measure of 
investors’ willingness to take risk. Iit is the short-term interest rate for each period t, and 
country i and fri have the definition already mentioned above. 
 
4.2. Baseline Results 
Our baseline results for the EC index overall suggest that FRI is significant with a 
positive coefficient, which means that if the FRI increases by 1 unit, then CAPB can 
increase by up to 0.52 percentage points (p.p.). In column 1, Table III, the control 
variables were omitted to see if they bias the impact of the rules and the effect is still 
robust. 
When control variables are included in column (2), Table III, the following have 
a significant impact on the dependent variable: run-up to the EMU, election period and 
ideological change in government composition. The interpretation is that during the 
years of implementation of the EMU in the EU-15 countries, CAPB is 1.19 p.p. higher. 
The years where ideological change took place resulted in an increment on CAPB of 
0.43 p.p. and, finally, years of election have a negative impact of 0.77. The ten member 
countries after 2003 have an increment of 1.23 p.p. on CAPB and those that have been 
part of the Euro-area since 1998 have a negative impact on CAPB of -0.87. 
The results obtained from a fixed effects OLS regression, column (3), Table III, 
are essentially the same, with two more variables becoming statistically significant, 
namely: the EU-10 countries after 2003 have an increment of 1.23 p.p. on CAPB and 
those that have been part of the Euro-area since 1998 have a negative impact on CAPB 
of 0.87. Column 4, Table III, reports a Two Stage Least Squares, with the instrument of 
FRI being its own lag and a variable that captures the commitment of governments
2
. 
FRI is no longer significant and the p-value of the Wu-Hausman test shows that there 
are no problems of endogeneity. However, there are concerns about reverse causality 
between the fiscal stance and FRI. However, by analysing the Granger Causality Test 
(Appendix CTable C-III), we cannot conclude whether, in fact, it is the implementation 
of fiscal rules that leads to better balances, or whether it is better fiscal outcomes that 
lead to the implementation of more rules.   
                                                     
2
 Similar to Debrun et al. (2008), we use a dummy variable that represents governments which, by their 
nature – coalition governments – have implemented commitment models, which easily allows for the 
implementation of fiscal rules. This variable was constructed based on (Hallerberg et al., 2009) and 
(Annett, 2006). Regarding the effectiveness of these instruments, see Debrun et al. (2008). 
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Table III - Baseline results: fiscal rules and fiscal performance 
  EC IMF 
Dependent Variable Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
2SLS 
(8) 
 
c -098 ** -0.70 ** -0.60 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.37 ** -0.88 
 
-0.73 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.95) 
 capb(-1) 0.63 *** 0.83 *** 0.68 *** 0.71 *** 0.61 *** 0.87 *** 0.75 *** 0.80 *** 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.17) 
 debt(-1) 0.02 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 ** 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 outputgap(-1) -0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
fri 0.51 *** 0.25 *** 0.52 *** 0.31 
 
0.29 * 0.18 
 
0.07 
 
-0.15 
 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.26) 
 emu - 
 
1.19 *** 2.05 *** 2.34 ** - 
 
0.89 ** 3.89 *** 3.76 *** 
   
(0.31) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(1.06) 
   
(0.38) 
 
(0.80 )  (0.83) 
 enlargement - 
 
0.20 
 
1.23 ** -1.30 *** - 
 
0.25 
 
0.49 
 
1.05 
 
   
(0.28) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.44) 
   
(0.34) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.70) 
 sgp - 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.87 * 1.30 ** - 
 
-0.13 
 
-1.00 ** -1.01 ** 
   
(0.20) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.54) 
   
(0.21) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.57) 
 legelec - 
 
-0.77 *** -0.72 *** -0.64 *** - 
 
-0.70 *** -0.72 *** -0.73 *** 
   
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.18) 
   
(0.18) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.20) 
 gov_new - 
 
0.43 ** 0.50 ** 0.59 ** - 
 
0.52 ** 0.66 *** 0.75 *** 
   
(0.20) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.25) 
   
(0.24) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.27) 
 mdms - 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 ** - 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 * 0.00 ** 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Number of observations 463 
 
437 
 
437 
 
397 
 
420 
 
366 
 
366 
 
324 
 
R
2
 0.72 
 
0.69 
 
0.76 
 
0.77 
 
0.73 
 
0.67 
 
0.78 
 
0.78 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.69 
 
0.68 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
0.70 
 
0.66 
 
0.74 
 
0.74 
 
Endogeneity test -  -  -  0.21  -  -  -  0.74  
Fixed Effects 1.97 *** - 
 
2.16 *** - 
 
2.55 *** - 
 
2.05 *** - 
 Random effects 
(Hausman test) 
        
  
       Period - 
 
20.66 ** - 
 
- 
 
  
 
15.94 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Cross-section -   13.40  -   -       9.82  -   -   
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denoting, respectively, 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range for EC’s FRI: 1991-2011 (463 observations), 1991-
2010 (437 observations and 397 observations). Period range for IMF’s FRI: 1990-2011 (420 
observations), 1991-2010 (366 observations and 324 observations). Instrumental variables are the FRI 
own lag and a variable for capturing government commitment.   
 
The use of the IMF’s Fiscal Rule Index generates some different results, 
although for the same period range, we only have 366 observations. The index is only 
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significant at a level of 10%, with no control variables included. Although the index 
takes into account the same characteristics and types of rules, the methodology used is 
different, so therefore the results might differ on account of that (see column (5)-(8), 
Table III). Thus, the methodology used to compute the index may have an important 
effect on the conclusions that can be made about the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
outcomes. 
We performed the same exercise for the IMF Expenditure Rule Index (ERI), 
using a calculation based on the methodology provided in the EC’s FRI database, which 
was only applied to rules targeting public expenditure. We considered Primary 
Expenditure as the dependent variable - interest payments are hardly controlled by 
governments - as expenditure rules are more effective with regard to expenditure alone, 
and not to the whole balance sheet (see Table IVTable IV). 
We performed a fixed effects OLS regression again, as well as an IV estimation 
using the ERI’s own lag as the instrument. Similar to the analysis for FRI, Column (1), 
Table IV, relates the possibility of control variables biasing the significance of the ERI 
on Primary Expenditure. Despite this omission, numerical expenditure rules contribute 
to the control of public expenditure at a significant level. This conclusion is valid when 
control variables are included in column (2), but with a smaller coefficient. In this way, 
if everything else is held constant, then the increase of one unit in ERI contributes to a 
decrease of the Primary Expenditures-to-GDP ratio of 0.18 p.p. in (2), and 0.37 p.p. in 
(3). The introduction of SGP, election periods, and changes in government ideology, are 
other explanatory variables which impact on Public Expenditure. The results remain 
robust when ERI instruments are used, confirming that the results are not biased on 
account of reverse causality. 
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Table IV - The impact of expenditure rules on primary expenditure 
Dependent Variable Primary Expenditure 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
 
c 12.99 *** 1.33 *** 9.41 *** 40.7 *** 
 
(3.42) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(2.71) 
 
(1.00) 
 pe(-1) 0.70 *** 0.98 *** 0.78 *** -0.66 *** 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.13) 
 debt(-1) -0.01 
 
-0.01 ** -0.01 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 outputgap(-1) 0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.09 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.06) 
 
eri -0.33 ** -0.18 ** -0.37 ** -0.88 *** 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.23) 
 emu - 
 
-0.44 * -1.47 
 
-2.64 
 
   
(0.25) 
 
(1.02) 
 
(1.65) 
 enlargement - 
 
-0.39 * -0.16 
 
-0.58 
 
   
(0.24) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.70) 
 sgp - 
 
0.23 
 
0.96 ** 2.59 *** 
   
(0.18) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.67) 
 legelec - 
 
0.63 *** 0.59 *** 0.62 ** 
   
(0.17) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.25) 
 gov_new - 
 
-0.41 ** -0.57 *** -0.77 *** 
   
(0.19) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.29) 
 mdms - 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Number of observations 464 
 
437 
 
437 
 
397 
 
R
2
 0.98 
 
0.97 
 
0.98 
 
0.97 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.97 
 
0.97 
 
0.97 
 
0.96 
 
Endogeneity test -  -  -  0.11  
Fixed Effects 2.56 *** 
 
1.54 ** 
 Random effects (Hausman test) 
        Period - 
 
17.88 * - 
 
- 
 
Cross-section -   33.09 *** - 
 
- 
 Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denoting, respectively, 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range: 1991-2011 (464 observations), 1991-2010 (437 
observations and 397 observations). Instrumental variables are the ERI own lag and a variable for 
capturing government commitment.   
 
To stress the importance of numerical fiscal rules, we performed an additional 
empirical exercise to assess the impact of rules on the yield of 10-year maturity bonds. 
The index shows significance in every regression computed, meaning that if FRI 
increases by one unit, then the yield, in (1) of Table V, decreases by 0.25 p.p. When 
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investors become more risk averse - vix increases – and we can see that, if everything 
else is held constant, yields decrease by 0.02 p.p. As expected, the variables 
representing better economic environment – GDPgr and IP – lead to lower values of 
sovereign bond yields. In column (3) of Table V, we performed a 2SLS. The 
endogeneity tests show that FRI is not endogenous with regards to causality. The 
Granger tests in Appendix C show that causality runs from FRI to the yields. 
In Appendix C, Error! Reference source not found., it is possible to observe 
regression results when considering different sets of explanatory variables and also the 
same regressions, but considering yield spread against Germany as the dependent 
variable. The conclusions are the same - that FRI is significant in all regressions and 
that variables capturing economic developments maintain their statistical significant as 
well.  
Overall, we observe that FRI is strongly significant in most regressions, as are 
the variables capturing developments in the EU and in the EMU (sgp, emu, and 
enlargement). Variables capturing country-specific developments are also important in 
explaining budget balances. When we only consider expenditure rules, these are also 
important for explaining primary expenditure ratios. Countries that apply rules to 
discretionary public expenditure, experience better expenditure ratios. In addition, 
capital markets react positively to countries that have implemented rules and demand 
lower yields in these cases.  
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Table V - The impact of FRI on 10-Year Bond Yield 
Dependent Variable 10 year bond yield  
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
 
c 6.44 *** 7.57 *** 6.25 *** 
 
(1.02) 
 
(0.92) 
 
(0.82) 
 capb(-1) -0.13 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 debt 0.00 
 
0.01 * 0.00 
 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 cpi 0.01 
 
-0.02 * 0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 ca 0.02 
 
0.08 *** 0.03 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 reer 0.00 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
(0.01) 
    
i 0.53 *** 0.47 *** 0.51 *** 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 ip -0.04 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 *** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 fri -0.25 *** -0.30 *** -0.34 *** 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.10) 
 vix -0.02 
 
-0.02 * -0.02 ** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 gdpgr -0.10 ** -0.13 *** -0.10 ** 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 Number of observations 337 
 
362 
 
335 
 
R
2
 0.63 
 
0.75 
 
0.68 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.62 
 
0.72 
 
0.68 
 Endogeneity test - 
 
- 
 
0.36 
 Cross-section fixed effects - 
 
3.33 *** - 
 Random effects 
(Hausman test) 
      
Cross-section 56.78 *** -   -   
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and 
*** denoting, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. 
Period range: 1995-2011 (337 observations), 1991-2010 (362 
observations and 335 observations). Instrumental variables are the 
FRI own lag and a variable for capturing government commitment. 
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4.3. Simulation 
Finally, we performed a simulation of the level of government debt, by computing 
an expenditure rule and applying it to real expenditure level, based on the specifications 
in Hauptmeier et al. (2010). For the detailed methodology please see Appendix D. 
The simulation exercise was made with the purpose of understanding debt 
developments of EU countries, assuming that they had adopted a rule for the 
discretionary component of public expenditures. 
Firstly, there are a few countries with unusual situations during the period 
considered, showing years where public expenditures were greater than the consolidated 
gross debt. For that reason, rule-based expenditure levels would lead to negative values 
of debt. 
Secondly, in the majority of countries the debt ratio is lower than the actual ratio 
when GDP was computed only using an expenditure multiplier of 0.3, taking into 
consideration only the last five year of the analysis. In 2013, only three countries do not 
present rule-based values with debt ratio above the actual one: Italy, Greece and 
Sweden. Sweden is the only case in the EU-15 countries that would not benefit much 
from a ruled-based expenditure path, with new debt developments very similarly to 
those of the actual path.  
Considering the SGP constraint of maintaining debt ratio below 60%, this 
barrier would have been exceeded much later and for Denmark this means that it would 
never experience debt ratios above 60%. For Austria, instead of being over 60% in 
1993, it would only reach this value in 2009, as well as France and Portugal, instead of 
2003 and 2004, respectively. Greece would not enter the EMU although adopted the 
SGP with debt ratios already above 60%, but would only pass it in 1996 and the barrier 
of 100% debt would only be achieved in 2009, instead of 1996. 
Overall, the fiscal stance of the majority of EU countries would have been much 
sounder if a rule had been applied to public expenditure since 1990. 
 18 
 
Figure 1: Actual and rule-based debt in percentage of GDP for EU-15 countries 
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5.  Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to assess whether those countries that 
implemented more, or better, fiscal rules have better budget balances, and consequently, 
better debt ratios. From the theory discussed, the general idea is that there is a relation 
between fiscal rules and fiscal balances. From our empirical study we confirm that 
countries with more fiscal rules, have better CAPB in fact, but we could not guarantee 
that causality runs from FRI to CAPB. Also, the methodology used to compute this type 
of indexes seems to be instrumental, given that the IMF’s FRI for the same countries 
produces different results from the ones computed with the EC’s FRI, even though 
broadly the same criteria are considered.  
With regard to the perspective of capital markets, we studied the impact of FRI 
on 10-year bond yields. Investors seem to reward countries that have implemented fiscal 
rules. This can be explained by the commitment associated with such rules and by 
greater certainty about fiscal results. 
With revenues being essential a-cyclical, we tried to see whether rules applied to 
public expenditures contribute to their control and to the consolidation of fiscal 
balances. Our regression results show that ERI has the ability to explain developments 
in primary expenditure. Therefore, it is justifiable to construct rules that specifically 
target the expenditure side of the budget. This leads to the second objective of our 
paper: to simulate debt developments of EU countries, assuming that they had 
implemented an expenditure rule in 1990. If public expenditure had increased at the 
growth rate of potential GDP, countries would have experienced smaller debt ratios in 
comparison to the actual ones, and would have complied more easily with the SGP 
constraint of keeping debt ratios below 60%. The results show that the fiscal stance of 
most EU countries would have been sounder if an expenditure rule had been used since 
1990. 
We should flag some caveats of our study notably that different methods of 
computing the fiscal rule index can lead to different results. It is recommended that 
further analysis be carried out on the proper methodology to be used, or on new 
instruments for capturing the commitment to rules, as this could contribute to reaching 
additional conclusions on this subject. 
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Appendix A – Stylised facts - figures 
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Figure A-II: Numerical fiscal rules by type of aggregate targeted since 1990 
Figure A-I: Evolution of total number of rules from 1990 to 2011 
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Figure A-III: Total numerical fiscal rules by country 
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Figure A-IV: Numerical fiscal rules by type of government since 1990 
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Figure A-V: Numerical fiscal rules by country in 2011 
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Figure A-VI: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 
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Figure A-VII: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Figure A-VIII: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Figure A-IX: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Appendix B – Data statistics 
Table B-I - Descriptive statistics 
Sample: 1990-2014 Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
Cyclically 
Adjusted Primary 
Balance 
CAPB 0.30 0.39 3.06 -1.09 10.67 647 
Debt-to-GDP DEBT 60.43 49.97 44.59 2.46 12.34 678 
Primary 
Expenditure 
PE 41.50 42.66 10.58 -2.54 11.65 657 
Output Gap OUTPUTGAP -0.12 -0.03 2.93 -0.06 6.21 669 
CE's FRI FRI 0.00 -0.21 1.00 0.59 2.13 593 
IMF's FRI FRI_IMF 2.40 2.44 0.86 0.44 1.85 443 
Expenditure Rule 
Index 
ERI 0.00 -0.50 1.00 2.31 8.91 594 
Run-up of the 
EMU Dummy 
EMU 0.11 0.00 0.31 2.47 7.13 675 
Entrance of 10 
countries in EU 
Dummy 
ENLARGEMENT 0.18 0.00 0.38 1.69 3.84 675 
Introduction of 
SGP Dummy 
SGP 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.50 1.25 675 
Election Year 
Dummy 
LEGELEC -19.04 0.00 137.67 -6.98 49.77 621 
Government 
Ideological Change 
Dummy 
GOV_NEW 0.27 0.00 0.44 1.03 2.06 539 
District Magnitude MDMS -425.45 -999.00 738.15 0.78 2.03 618 
10 Year Bond 
Yield 
YIELD 5.96 4.99 2.94 2.36 11.68 479 
Chicago Board 
Options Exchange 
Market Volatility 
Index 
VIX 20.45 21.98 5.89 0.30 2.15 713 
Short-term interest 
rate 
I 6.51 4.39 8.12 5.10 39.12 524 
Current Account 
Balance 
CA -2.90 -2.77 3.24 -1.13 9.51 632 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
REER 99.22 99.48 14.24 0.39 5.38 540 
GDP growth rate GDPGR 2.23 2.40 3.71 -1.71 17.72 663 
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Appendix C – Additional Results 
Table C-I - Estimation results considering the impact of FRI on 10 Year Bond Yield 
Dependent Variable 10 year bond yield  
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
 
c 5.89 *** 5.77 *** 5.66 *** 
 
(1.04 ) (1.20 ) (1.07) 
 capb(-1) -0.04 
 
- 
 
-0.03 
 
 
(0.03 ) 
 
(0.04) 
 debt 0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00) 
 
 
(0.00 ) 
 
(0.00) 
 cpi 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 
 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
 cab 0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.02 ) (0.02 ) (0.03) 
 reer 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
 
i 0.54 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 
 
(0.04 ) (0.04 ) (0.04) 
 ip -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 
 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
 fri -0.30 *** -0.32 *** -0.42 *** 
 
(0.07 ) (0.07 ) (0.10) 
 vix -0.03 *** -0.03 ** -0.04 *** 
 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
 gdpgr -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
Number of observations 338 
 
338 
 
311 
 
R
2
 0.60 
 
0.59 
 
0.60 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.59 
 
0.58 
 
0.59 
 Endogeneity test - 
 
- 
 
0.01 
 Random effects 
(Hausman test) - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Cross-section 56.77 *** 53.56 *** - 
 Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and 
*** denoting, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. 
Period range: 1995-2011 (338 observations and 331 observations). 
Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and a variable for 
capturing government commitment. 
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Table C-II - Estimation results considering the impact of FRI on 10-Year Yield Spreads 
against Germany 
Dependent Variable 10-year yield spread against Germany 
  OLS  
(1)  
OLS  
(2)  
2SLS 
(3)   
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5)  
2SLS 
(6) 
 
      
c -2.46 ** -2.68 ** -2.74 *** c -1.92 ** -0.65 
 
-3.68 *** 
 
(0.98) 
 
(1.16) 
 
(1.03) 
 
(0.96) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.78) 
 capb -0.06 * - 
 
-0.05 
 
capb(-1) -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.16 *** 
 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 debt 0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
debt 0.00 
 
0.02 *** 0.00 
 
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 cpi 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** cpi 0.07 *** 0.02 ** 0.06 *** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 cab 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
cab 0.02 
 
0.10 *** 0.03 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 reer -0.02 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** reer -0.02 ** - 
 
- 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
    
i 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** i 0.41 *** 0.27 *** 0.34 *** 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
 ip -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** ip -0.03 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 fri -0.28 *** -0.32 *** -0.37 *** fri -0.23 *** 0.09 
 
-0.19 ** 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.10) 
 vix -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** vix -0.02 * -0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 gdpgr -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 ** gdpgr -0.10 ** -0.12 *** -0.08 * 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
Number of observations 338 
 
338 
 
311 
 
337 
 
362 
 
335 
 
R
2
 0.57 
 
0.56 
 
0.57 
 
0.62 
 
0.73 
 
0.54 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.56 
 
0.55 
 
0.56 
 
0.61 
 
0.70 
 
0.53 
 Endogeneity test - 
 
- 
 
0.08 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.99 
 Cross-section fixed effects - 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
 
8.60 *** - 
 
Random effects 
(Hausman test) - 
 
- 
 
- 
  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Cross-section 145.06 *** 98.83 ***       122.62 ***         
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denoting, respectively, 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range: 1995-2011 (338, 337 and 331observartions), 1991-
2010 (362 and 335 observations). Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and a variable for capturing 
government commitment. 
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Table C-III - Granger Causality 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 CAPB does not Granger Cause FRI 436 0.28068 0.7554 
 FRI does not Granger Cause CAPB 
 
1.95933 0.1422 
 YIELD does not Granger Cause FRI 388 0.53108 0.5884 
 FRI does not Granger Cause YIELD 
 
3.90872 0.0209 
 PE does not Granger Cause ERI 437 4.61091 0.0104 
 ERI does not Granger Cause PE 
 
1.01303 0.3640 
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Appendix D – Simulation Methodology and Figures 
The methodology of the simulation exercise is based on Hauptmeier et al. (2010). The 
first step is to construct a new expenditure path that follows a predetermined rule of 
growth. For the purpose of this exercise we define the rule growth rate as the same 
growth rate of potential GDP. The formulas used are defined as follows: 
Table D-I - Simulation’s Methodology 
Concept Formula 
Expenditure path 
         (     )                 
   is the rule-based expenditure path.  
   is the actual expenditure path. 
    is the growth rule 
Debt path 
            , where 
    is the difference between the rule-based expenditure path and the actual 
expenditure path. 
Interest rate 
        , 
r is the implicit interest rate computed as Interests over Gross Consolidated 
Debt at period t. 
GDP 
      (        ), 
     is the difference between the rule-based expenditure path and the actual 
expenditure path in percentage of GDP, m is the expenditure multiplier – we 
consider four possible values 0.3, 0.75, 1, 1.5
3
. 
We used total expenditure excluding interest, consolidated gross debt, GDP at market prices - all expressed in 
billions of national currency for each country extracted from the AMECO Database. 
 
  
                                                     
3
 GDP was computed considering different values for the impact of expenditure on output. The range 
used was based on Baum et al. (2012) and Boussard et al. (2012). 
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Figure D-I: Actual and rule-based expenditure in percentage of GDP for EU-10 countries 
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Figure D-II: Actual and rule-based expenditure in billions of national currency for EU-15 countries 
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Figure D-III: Actual and rule-based expenditure in billions of national currency for EU-10 countries 
  
 37 
 
 
Figure D-IV: Actual and rule-based debt in billions of national currency for EU-15 countries 
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Figure D-V: Actual and rule-based debt in billions of national currency for EU-10 countries 
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Figure D-VI: Actual expenditure and rule-based expenditure in percentage of GDP for EU-15 countries 
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Figure D-VII: Actual expenditure and rule-based expenditure for EU-10 countries 
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Figure D-VIII: Actual output and rule-based output by expenditure multiplier for EU-15 countries 
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Figure D-IX: Actual output and rule-based output by expenditure multiplier for EU-10 countries 
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Table D-II - Actual debt and expenditure values, rule-based debt and expenditure in 
absolute values and relative to GDP for specific years 
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Table D-III - Simulation example for Portugal 
 
 
